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Abstract 
In this paper, I address an under-studied question in the comparative political economy of migration. 
How have trade unions shaped the attitudes of their members toward immigration? Unions are at the 
core of left wing politics in most European countries, and support for immigration is usually a left-
wing position. However, many of the core constituents of unions are those whose interests are most 
adversely affected by an increase in the supply of labor. I show that the pattern of European trade-
union leaders becoming supportive of open immigration policies (identified in previous literature) has 
solidified over the past decade. After discussing how unions have overcome the key economic 
dilemma in their rhetoric, I provide evidence that this rhetoric has shaped the attitudes of union 
members, that the effect has become stronger over time, and that the effect is (mostly) robust to the 
exclusion of countries where self-selection into unions on the basis of ideology is likely to be 
strongest. 
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Introduction
Left wing organizations — especially trade unions — in Europe and North America face complex
challenges in dealing with immigration. Penninx and Roosblad (2000) identify three dilemmas facing
unions. In this paper, I examine how unions have reacted to the first of these dilemmas — whether
to resist or cooperate in the migration process — and show that unions have, on the whole, taken a
pro-immigration position in Europe. To demonstrate this, I combine a brief review of recent public
positioning by union leaders with an analysis of the European Social Survey (ESS). Together these two
exercises suggest that unions do, in fact, influence attitudes, and they do so primarily by convincing
members to embrace the cultural diversity brought by immigration. This pattern was increasingly strong
for the first decade of the new millennium, though this increase slowed after the onset of the economic
crisis.
Theories of unions and immigration
In a recent article on the politics of immigration in Western Europe, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010),
after concluding that the framing of immigration makes a very large difference in responses to survey
questions, called for more research into the institutions and political actors that have the power to shape
the debate. They argued:
A much more fruitful approach, we think, would be for political-economic analysis to focus
less on people’s responses to opinion surveys about immigration and more on self-interested
actors operating as organised groups to lobby policymakers and frame public debates in
ways that benefit them. (p. 80)
This paper takes their challenge seriously, using survey evidence as an important piece of the argument
nonetheless. Since I assume that unions play a large role in framing many political issues for their
members, and a smaller role in framing those issues for non-members,1 I can use individual responses to
detect an ideological effect, which I think of as simply the cumulative effect of repeated framing effects.
To show that unions frame the debate in a solidaristic way, I first examine the relationship between
existing policies and outcomes, on the one hand, and union positions, on the other. Next, I review some
of the literature on union rhetoric and lobbying. I then provide a few examples of recent union rhetoric.
Finally, I turn to the literature on immigration attitude formation before presenting survey evidence.
The simplest frame for thinking about the relationship between trade unions and immigration pre-
dicts that unions, by advocating restrictionist immigration policies, will reduce the supply of labor in
their country and increase the wages of their members. This fits neatly with basic economic theory, em-
bodied in the factor price equalization models of trade and migration discussed by Samuelson (1948) and
frequently known as the Heckscher-Olin or Hecksher-Olin-Samuelson (HOS) model. The HOS model
predicts that wages will be higher in countries where labor is scarce relative to capital and land. Cross-
national variation in wages, the price of labor, will be reduced by the flow of labor intensive goods from
countries where labor is abundant, relative to the other factors, to countries where labor is scarce.2 Alter-
natively, labor itself can move. If immigrants move from low wage areas to high wage areas, they raise
wages in the areas they leave and lower wages in the areas to which they go. The empirical basis for this
claim is not as strong as the theoretical basis. There is an extensive literature on the impact of immigra-
tion on wages (Pischke and Velling, 1997; Borjas, 2003; Zorlu and Hartog, 2005; Venturini and Villosio,
2006). A reasonable interpretation of this literature (though by no means the only possible interpretation)
is that low-skill immigration has a small negative impact on the wages of low-skilled natives, a moderate
1Certainly, unions may help frame political debates for the public at large, but my evidence relies on the assumption that
this effect is smaller than the effect on members. According to the ETUC (2003, pp. 10), when unions issue publications
and conduct public campaigns concerning migration and ethnic discrimination, “[t]rade union members are the main intended
audience of the material, followed by emigrant and ethnic minority members who are in the union.”
2This is a straightforward application of the principle of comparative advantage described by Ricardo (1996).
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negative impact on the wages of previous low-skill immigrants, and a small or negligible positive effect
for the rest of the population.
Past research on union position taking with regard to immigration has often simply assumed that
unions believe that immigration has a negative impact on union bargaining power,3 though some of
the work that focused on Western Europe recognised that unions play a more complex role (Schmitter,
1981). More recent work has highlighted the diversity of positions taken by union leaders, a diversity
that can be seen over time, across countries, and across unions within a country (Haus, 2002). As
Pajares (2008) argues about a basic supply-demand framework, “(t)hese ideas carry a lot of weight
in the trade union tradition, even though...It is now understood that segmentation of the labour market
means that competition between already established workers — the local workforce — and those recently
arrived exists to only a very limited extent.” Briggs (Briggs, 2001) details the history of unions in the
United States, arguing that until shortly before his book was published, American unions had consistently
assumed that they were in competition with immigrants and acted to limit that competition by limiting
immigration. While he acknowledges that the AFL-CIO had adapted some of it rhetoric to account for the
possibility that enforcement was not possible, he was unsure whether this was an honest and sustainable
policy shift.
Policy context Watts (2002). argues that union leadership in France, Italy,4 and Spain has moved
toward supporting more open immigration policies. She projects that leadership in the US will do so as
well, an argument that was mostly correct, as can be seen from recent statements by unions or the two
umbrella labor organizations in the US.5 The main mechanism that drives her theory is competition and a
pragmatic fear of a two-tier labor market, but all of the countries she examines are in situations where the
status quo involves poor enforcement of immigration and large numbers of undocumented immigrants.
Watts argues that union leaders see immigrants as a potential source of new members, but that as long as
they remain undocumented, they undermine the national social contract and depress wages for native and
documented immigrant union members. While the Spanish, French, and Italian labor movements have
used different tactics to woo immigrants, the goal is to increase union density and power by attracting
immigrants to unions and the political positions they endorse, as well as to decrease competition from
the unregulated sector of the labor market.
This position is driven by the belief that the state either will not or cannot control immigration from
poor countries. The European Trade Union Commission (ETUC), writing in 2004, argued that so-called
‘zero-immigration’ policies “offered European citizens a false sense of protection” (ETUC, 2004, pp. 3)
Given that assumption, it is easy to see why unions would become more supportive of open immigration
policies. The most rational strategy for union leaders, especially those who lead low-skill unions, is to try
to eliminate the underground economy by strengthening enforcement of immigration and employment
laws while allowing more immigrants to enter the country. This should lead to better working conditions
for migrants (who are vulnerable to exploitation by employers because of their tenuous status and un-
willingness to engage with authorities), while also ensuring that the various social contracts unions have
negotiated in the last half of the twentieth century, which include such benefits as a minimum wage, job
security, and safe working conditions, can be upheld.
On the other hand, union elites have long been thought to maintain a conception of the economy
in which labor is arrayed against capital, and all members of the working class would benefit from
solidaristic collective action. This should lead union elites to think of immigrants as fellow members of
the working class, and therefore members of an in-group. This is obviously complicated by racial and
linguistic differences (Schmitter, 1981; Frymer, 2008), but more ideologically driven unions are likely
to overcome these problems. By identifying a common opponent in the form of employers, it seems
3One historical study, for instance, notes that American unions in the late 19th century demanded more restrictions to combat
“cheap contract workers.” However, she also points out that there was a clear note of xenophobia in much union rhetoric at the
time (Collomp, 1988).
4Early evidence of this transition can be seen in (Pinna, 1986).
5See, for instance, (AFL-CIO and CTW, 2009).
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reasonable to suppose that union leaders and immigrants may be able to consider each other members
of a single class. More ideological unions will lead their members to focus more on class and less on
other differences, and the typical member of such unions will have greater reason to consider class the
relevant framework for thinking about immigration policy. Identification with one’s class can then lead
an individual to prefer policies that benefit other members of that class (such as poor immigrants, in the
case of the working class).
Types of unions Solidarity is a particular form of social identification. It is closely tied to what Daw-
son (1994) called “linked fate,” or the belief that one’s own life prospects are closely tied to the prospects
of a group of which one is a member. The relationship between identification with one’s class and union
membership is not entirely clear, since causation can run both ways. Kelly and Kelly (1994) argue that
participation in union activities is the result of identification, while Cregan, Bartram and Stanton (2009)
argue that effective union leaders engender identification, which, in turn, leads to participation. In using
solidarity to explain the relationship between union membership and attitudes toward immigration, I am
assuming that union membership leads to identification, rather than attitudes leading to union member-
ship.
This is, of course, an important inferential problem for studies of unions’s effects on their members.
Traditional approaches to examining the selection effect of union membership include controlling for
the various demographics that predict attitudes and controlling for ideological self-placement (arguing
that this is more stable than other attitudes, and so can be seen as a proxy for pre-unionization attitudes).
In this paper, I use both of these strategies, but I also introduce a third approach. I argue that, based
on the institutional context and past strategic decisions, unions in some countries are substantially more
activist-based than in other countries.
The selection effect will be strongest in countries where the collective action problem faced by unions
is most severe. In countries like France, where collective bargaining coverage is substantially wider than
union membership, there is a strong incentive to free-ride on the union representation of others. Only
those members who feel ideologically committed to the union are likely to join. At the other extreme
is the closed-shop system, such as that found in the United States, where almost all workers who are
represented by a union are also members. Because they become members by virtue of taking a job,
considerations other than ideology likely dominate their decision-making process, and so selection is
probably quite weak. Below, I demonstrate that survey responses provide some support for this argument,
as the difference between members and non-members is much stronger in countries where labor market
institutions encourage self-selection.
Public Rhetoric
In 2003, the ETUC published a report on the approach of unions to immigration and ethnic dis-
crimination. It took for granted that all of the national confederations it surveyed were relatively pro-
immigration and anti-discrimination. This clearly holds for discrimination, but their positions on migra-
tion were less clear. Only seven of the 24 confederations they surveyed had recently campaigned for less
restrictive laws, while sixteen had campaigned against discrimination (ETUC, 2003, pp. 90). In some
cases, this may simply have been the result of a lack of salience for immigration, but it could also be
because of divisions within the unions about the proper response. Over the last decade, though, unions
across Europe have addressed the issue, which is not so central to political conflict in many countries,
that taking a position is a necessary part of participating in politics.
Unions have many ways of addressing their members. While researchers are not often privy to
internal union discussions, it is possible to examine the way unions use the media to shape the opinions
of their members. We can see both normative and practical arguments at work in the public statements of
unions. For instance, the ETUC, along with a number of NGOs issued a joint statement in 2007 (ETUC,
Solididar and Picum, 2007). This statement began by taking a clear position:
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All individuals residing on the European Union territory, regardless of their legal status,
are human beings and as such are the subjects of fundamental human rights. When they
are performing work, they are subjects of fundamental rights at work, as acknowledged in
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in other international instruments. Any
instrument aiming at reducing irregular migration must recognize and promote these rights.
The statement continues in this vein, though it contains a number of statements that could be interpreted
as reactions to illegal competition, tying further immigration reform to employer accountability for com-
pliance with all labor regulations. Similarly, the 2004 ETUC response to the Commission’s Green Paper
on economic migration emphasizes the Commission’s failure to ground its analysis in fundamental hu-
man rights, but goes on to say that this grounding is important precisely because it prevents a two-tier
labor market ETUC (2004).
The ETUC’s 2013 Action Plan on Migration (ETUC, 2013) is justified on both practical and human-
itarian grounds. Repeatedly invoking the importance of equal treatment for the maintenance of labor
market standards, the argument the Executive Committee lays out is that most current policies fail to
recognize the fundamental rights of migrants, which is both wrong in itself and contributes to the weak-
ening of native workers’ rights. This rhetorical strategy — arguing that native and migrant workers
share the same basic interests — allows the ETUC to sit comfortably within the left-labor coalition that
Watts (2002) identifies as a sometimes uncomfortable alliance. By focusing on an aspect of the eco-
nomic impact of migration that would be improved through more immigrant-friendly policies, the ETUC
acknowledges the concerns of many members without weakening the overall pro-migrant message.
National Confederations National trade union confederations strike a similar balance, though they
tend to fall more on the pragmatic side, focusing on the importance of maintaining labor standards in
the face of inflows of (often undocumented) migrants who often work in the informal sector. One of
the most common refrains is that unions have the ‘realistic’ view, while opponents of immigration —
especially those on the populist right — are naive to believe that these flows can be reversed. The
national confederations in Belgium, France, Ireland, and the UK have all recently lobbied in favor of
steps to regularize the status of undocumented migrants (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, 2009, pp. 131),
largely on practical grounds.
The Danish employment ministry recently conducted a survey of Poles living in Copenhagen. While
the results are interesting in themselves, the ways in which the survey was described by the labor group
are also interesting. In response to the survey, the LO (the Danish labor umbrella organization), empha-
sized the importance of one finding, which suggested that few Poles had been approached about joining
trade unions, but most would be open to it (Landsorganisationen i Denmark, 2009). This echoes the
account of Watts (2002), who also argued that labor movements in Europe would see immigrants as
potential new members, rather than as competitors.
The British Trade Union Confederation, despite a legacy of protectionist activism in the post-war
period and a calculated silence on migration issues into the 1990s (Jefferys, 2004), now “supports the
freedom of movement of workers in the European Union and we support a managed migration system for
those outside the EU, based on the principles of workers rights” (TUC, 2010). In an effort to demonstrate
a commitment to the well-being of immigrants in Britain, the same organization has issued pamphlets in
numerous languages to make the transition easier for migrants, and to promote their safety while at work.
The easiest way to understand this willingness to promote immigration is through a solidarity account of
union opinion.
In the wake of the recent Swiss referendum to restrict immigration, trade union officials took the
side of the mainstream political parties and the main business confederation, providing many arguments
for a ‘No’ vote. Rechsteiner, Rieger and Ambrosetti (2014) highlighted the parts of the referendum
most problematic from the union leadership’s point of view, saying that they opposed it “because it ran
roughshod over the rights of migrants; because it weakened measures to protect wages and employment
conditions; and because it essentially cast doubt on the bilateral accords with the EU.” This argument
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begins with a solidaristic claim and follows with an argument that is more in the competitive vein,
acknowledging the economic trade-offs.6
North American Comparisons American unions, while frequently citing covert competition (a term
I will use as shorthand for competition in the context of poorly enforced restrictions) as a reason for
supporting immigration reform, have also continuously emphasized the importance of aiding immigrants
for immigrants’ sake. The top link on the AFL-CIO’s immigration web site is a report documenting the
importance of unions for immigrants’ social mobility (Schmitt, 2010). The Change to Win Coalition is
made up of a number of unions, the largest of which (SEIU) has a relatively large immigrant membership.
In many of its public statements, Change to Win strikes a balance in its advocacy for immigration reform
between preventing covert competition and promoting solidarity, beginning with a call for a path to
legalization, emphasizing the importance of immigrant rights, and continuing with a series of arguments
about the benefits for the native work force (see, for instance, Change to Win, 2010).
Canadian trade unions, too, use a combination of covert competition language and solidaristic rhetoric.
Their arguments center on the concept of human rights, decrying the stronger position of employers rel-
ative to foreign workers. On April 13, one labor leader criticized the government for detaining Thai
workers who had overstayed their visas. He said, “(t)his is the latest example that both the Harper
government and the farm industry are both complicit in a system designed to exploit foreign workers
and dispose of them,” while an official at the Canadian Labor Congress criticized the Temporary Foreign
Worker program under which those workers had entered, accusing the government of being ”unabashedly
proud this program is employer driven” (Congress, 2010). This is the rhetoric of a group that sees poorer
immigrants arrayed with them against employers and against the Conservative government.
On the whole, then, it appears that the patterns identified by Watts (2002) generally hold for union
elites. Recognizing that undocumented migrants and migrants on temporary labor contracts are unlikely
to disappear, unions argue that freer immigration would strengthen the position of native labor, though
there is an equally strong emphasis on solidarity and human rights. This rhetoric appears to be common
across immigrant-receiving wealthy countries. There are (at least) two ways that this rhetoric could
influence policy outcomes. First, it could influence policymakers directly, shaping their understanding
of immigration or their beliefs about the constellation of forces for and against changes in current policy.
Second, this rhetoric could influence union members, shaping their understanding of immigration and,
ultimately, their choices in the voting booth.
However, demonstrating that leaders take a position in public is not sufficient evidence that they are
communicating this message to members. In particular, while I have identified a few common themes in
trade union statements, the extent to which this rhetoric is pursued in the workplace, in union halls, and in
other places that union members may be influenced by their leaders, is unclear. If the public rhetoric and
policy statements cited above do not resemble the kinds of arguments made in internal union discussions,
then the differences between members and non-members on immigration may be negligible. Similarly,
union members might ignore their leaders, preferring to develop their political opinions from mass media
or other sources.
Elite-mass connections
Union elites are a subset of potential opinion leaders, or political elites whose positions or personal
choices lead them to acquire more information about public policy and to communicate norms based on
that information to others. The public opinion literature on opinion leaders is quite large, but the core of
this argument is clear. According to Converse (1964, pp. 35)
6When explaining their failure to win the referendum, these same officials point out that illegal work practices such as
unofficial wage garnishing are more common among migrants, suggesting that even a relatively open migration system cannot
always solve the enforceability dilemma.
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If it is true that the mass of less knowledgeable people rely upon informal communication
from a few more informed people for cues about desirable or appropriate behavior, then
the lines of behavior choices followed in politics might indeed show strong sociostructural
patterns, even though many uninformed actors have little of the opinion leaders’ coherent
and organized understanding of why one behavior is more appropriate than another.
Union leaders fit this mold well. They have both professional and, often, personal commitments to the
politics of labor relations, and they are therefore likely to pay more attention to issues like immigration
than the typical member. If members believe that the leaders are honest or share their interests, they are
likely to trust union elites over other potential opinion leaders.
The first key question, then, is whether union members trust their own leaders. The simple fact that
union leaders are usually elected is certainly not sufficient to generate trust, as can be seen from any sur-
vey on trust in elected politicians. Empirical evidence on trust in trade unions is mixed. Indeed, Greene,
Black and Ackers (2000) demonstrate that it can vary sharply even between two neighboring plants.
However, their professional incentives usually mesh with the (economic) interests of their members, so
members are likely to trust leaders’ analyses of public policy in most cases, and are also more likely to
embrace the positions taken by leaders than are non-members.
The second key question is whether union members receive policy messages from their leaders. If
members attend regular meetings,7 this is, of course, an easy task. However, there are many other ways
that unions communicate with members. They often have newsletters, web sites, and media-relations
personnel to make their positions known. Particularly during political campaigns, they also go door-to-
door to communicate endorsements and policy preferences. Together, these tools are probably sufficient
to make sure that most union members understand the basic orientation of their leaders’ positions, even
if the details are less clear.
Survey Analysis
Given conflicting theories about the position-taking of union elites, the effect of union membership
on support for open immigration policies remains an open question. To test the effects, I use the Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS, 2012), examining the differences between members and non-members across
twenty-eight countries and six survey round (running from 2002 to 2013). This survey asked respondents
six questions concerning immigration8
• Should we allow many or few immigrants a different race or ethnic group from most [country]
people?
• How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?
• How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?
• Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here
from other countries?
• [W]ould you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people com-
ing to live here from other countries?
• Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other
countries?
7Data on attendance at union meetings is scarce, but Rothstein (2001, pp. 223) reports that in the early 1990s, just over a
third of Swedish employees had attended a meeting in the previous month.
8Round one includes additional immigration questions, but these six questions were asked across all six rounds, allowing
us to compare the effect of unions across a wide variety of countries.
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These six questions address different types of immigration attitudes, but are generally very closely
related. They vary along two dimensions. First, they differ on whether their emphasis is the economic
or cultural dimension of immigration politics and, second, they vary on whether they are asking about
perceived impact or preferred policy. Table 1 displays this categorization.9
Evaluation Policy preference
Ethnic-cultural Cultural impact Different ethnicity
Ambiguous Overall impact Immigrants from poor countries
Economic Economic impact Same ethnicity
Table 1: This displays the six questions concerning immigration that are regularly asked in the ESS.
The six variables are closely related to each other (Cronbach’s α = 0.88), but can be conceptually
distinguished on two dimensions: Whether the question asks for an evaluation of immigration’s impact
vs. a policy preference, and whether the question primarily raises economic vs. ethno-cultural concerns.
In order to facilitate comparison across variables, I rescale these variables from 0 to 1. Table 2
displays the descriptive statistics of these and other variables used below. These are weighted using
design weights for each country but not for country/population weights, so these are not ‘representative’
of the European population.
The pattern of means on the immigration scales meets our expectations. Respondents have a marginally
more negative attitude toward migrants from poor countries (0.49) than those who are of a different race
or ethnicity (0.51), but this difference is much smaller than that between these immigrants and those who
share the same race or ethnicity as the country’s majority (0.61). The European public also seems to
evaluate the cultural impact (0.58) of migration more positively than the economic impact (0.50).
This pattern could be a genuine difference or it could be the result of social desirability bias (Malho-
tra, Margalit and Mo, 2011). If it is a genuine difference, then Europeans are more willing to embrace
cultural diversity than we might, perhaps, have thought. If, on the other hand, this is about social desir-
ability, this difference may not reflect underlying attitudes as clearly. Since survey respondents are often
reluctant to appear racist, giving negative answers to a question about the cultural impact of immigration
can be fraught. A key caveat for the analysis below, then, is that if this bias is of a different strength for
union members and non-members, the results may not accurately measure the differential strengths of
union effects on cultural and economic attitudes.
Across all six questions, union members are more positive (pro-immigration) than similar non-
members. Figure 1 shows the output of OLS regressions10 with standard demographic controls and
country fixed effects. It also displays the effect of one additional year of education on each of the vari-
ables for comparison. It shows that, across all six attitudes, unions have an impact similar to that of one
year of education. Given the importance of education in the literature on immigration attitudes (Mayda,
2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014), an effect of a similar magnitude
suggests that union membership is an important determinant of support for immigration.
Figure 1 also contains hints of a union’s position as a cross-pressured group. The two weakest effects
(and the only two that appear to be weaker than the effects of education) appear when the dependent
variable contains an economic emphasis. In the first case, when asked whether immigrants who share the
majority ethnicity should be allowed to move to their country, union members are weakly more positive
9It is true that the policy question about individuals from the same ethnicity may still raise cultural concerns, but since it is
asked immediately after the question about individuals of a different ethnicity, the respondent is likely to perceive the question
as downplaying cultural concerns.
10In all cases, ordered probit or logit regressions produce similar results.
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Variable Min Max Mean S.D.
Union 0 1 0.23 0.42
ESS Round 1 6 3.45 1.69
Year 2002 2013 2007.20 3.42
Urban 0 1 0.17 0.37
Rural 0 1 0.40 0.49
Log-Income 6.09 12.13 10.04 0.92
Education (Years) 0 56 12.26 3.98
Education (> Median) 0 1 0.44 0.50
Male 0 1 0.48 0.50
Age 13 103 45.95 18.25
Immigration Scale 0 1 0.53 0.21
Imm. Policy 0 1 0.54 0.26
Imm. Evaluation 0 1 0.52 0.20
Imm. Cultural 0 1 0.55 0.23
Imm. Economic 0 1 0.55 0.22
Imm. Poor 0 1 0.49 0.29
Imm. Same Race 0 1 0.61 0.28
Imm. Different Race 0 1 0.51 0.29
Imm. Better/Worse 0 1 0.50 0.22
Imm. Cultural Evaluation 0 1 0.58 0.25
Imm. Economic Evaluation 0 1 0.50 0.24
Variable N
Countries 25
Country-Years 124
Respondents 236,667
Table 2: This table displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis below. Note
that the number of respondents included in the models below is less than displayed here due to missing
data and that I have excluded Israel, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Cultural impact
Overall impact
Economic impact
Different ethnicity
From poor countries
Same ethnicity
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015
Effect of Union Membership/Education on Immigration Attitudes
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Union membership
Education (1 year)
Figure 1: This shows the difference between the responses of union members and non-members on six immigration questions
after controlling for education, income (logged), age, age2, gender, living in a rural setting, being a native, survey round, and
country fixed effects. For comparison, the coefficient on age at completion of education is also displayed for each question.
Note that all dependent variables are scaled to run from 0 (least immigrant friendly) to 1 (most immigrant friendly).
8
Total
Policy
Evaluation
Economics
Culture
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015
Effect of Union Membership/Education on Immigration Attitudes
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Union membership
Education (1 year)
Figure 2: This shows the difference between the responses of union members and non-members on six immigration questions
after controlling for education, income (logged), age, age2, gender, living in a rural setting, being a native, survey round, and
country fixed effects. For comparison, the coefficient on age at completion of education is also displayed for each question.
Note that all dependent variables are scaled to run from 0 (least friendly to immigration) to 1 (most friendly to immigration).
than non-members. The effect is much stronger when asked to think about potential immigrants of a
different race or ethnicity. Similarly, when asked to describe the economic impact of immigration, the
difference between members and non-members is muted compared to the corresponding difference over
the cultural impact. From Table 1 and the results presented in Figure 1, five logical combinations of
immigration questions can be constructed. First, I construct a simple average of the six questions, each
normalized to run from 0 (most anti-immigration) to 1 (most pro-immigration). This scale, which by
construction also runs from 0 to 1, has a Cronbach’s α of 0.88 in the full sample, suggesting that it
measures a single general orientation toward immigrants fairly well.
Next, I divide Table 1 vertically, distinguishing between evaluations of immigration’s impact on the
host society on the one hand and policy preferences on the other. This yields two additional scales with
fairly strong reliability measures (α = 0.85 and α = 0.87). Finally, I divide the table vertically, using
the top row and the bottom row as scales measuring ethnic/cultural concerns and economic concerns,
respectively. These two-item scales are also quite strongly correlated, though their reliability scores are
substantially weaker (0.6 and 0.66).11
Figure 2 compares the effect of union membership and education on the five scales discussed above.
It shows that union membership is more strongly associated with cultural variables than with economic
variables, and slightly more strongly associated with policy variables than with evaluations. This pattern
is consistent with union leaders’ public rhetorical positions. They recognize the economic tradeoffs, but
for both practical and solidaristic reasons, they take a strong stand in favor of a more open policy.
This effect has been getting stronger over time. Figure 3 shows that mean effect of union membership
on immigration attitudes was quite weak in the first round of the ESS (2002), and became stronger over
time. This is consistent with the fact that almost all of the recent union rhetoric is strongly supportive of
immigration, while that of the late twentieth century was less reliably pro-migrant.
The slight dip in the strength of the effect in the fifth wave, which took place at the height of the crisis
(2010 and 2011), is also consistent with the results of Dancygier and Donnelly (2014). They showed
11Eisinga, Grotenhuis and Pelzer (2013) caution against over-interpreting Cronbach’s α with two-item scales, saying that
they are likely to underestimate the reliability of such scales, and recommend using the Spearman-Brown formula, which in
this case produces virtually identical results.
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Round 6 (2012)
Round 5 (2010)
Round 4 (2008)
Round 3 (2006)
Round 2 (2004)
Round 1 (2002)
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
Effect of Union Membership on Immigration Attitudes
l
l
l
l
l
l
Figure 3: This shows the difference between the responses of union members and non-members on six immigration questions
after controlling for education, income (logged), age, age2, gender, living in a rural setting, being a native, survey round, and
country random effects (with the coefficient on union membership allowed to vary at the country level). Note that the dependent
variable is scaled to run from 0 (least friendly to immigration) to 1 (most friendly to immigration).
that the effect of the economic crisis on immigration attitudes was not to shift the level of support for
immigration, but rather the composition, leading groups who are traditionally the ‘losers’ of globalization
to turn against immigration somewhat (a turn that was, to a large degree, canceled out by increased
support among other groups). Figure 3 though, suggests that even this moderate effect of the crisis may
be diminished, since by the sixth round, the effect of union membership appears to be increasing again.
The time trend in the effect of union membership is statistically significant in a variety of hierarchical
models.12 Since the exact sample of countries changes year to year and survey round to survey round,
these models (including that on which Figure 3 is based) allow the effect of union membership to vary by
country. That the differences remain so stark suggests that trade unions have, over the last decade, either
become more strongly committed to open immigration policies or have done a better job of convincing
their members. It is certainly some combination of these two factors, but, given the findings of Haus
(2002) and Watts (2002), it seems likely that the move toward favoring pro-immigrant policies had been
mostly completed among European trade unions by the beginning of the twenty-first century, and the
time trend depicted here is driven by more stable and convincing arguments by union leaders.
The problem of self-selection
The fact that union members are substantially more favorable toward immigration than similar non-
members suggests that the pro-immigration message of union leaders is getting through to their members.
However, it is also possible that union members join unions because they are ideologically left-leaning,
rather than the other way around.13 If pro-immigration workers choose to join unions to further their
political preferences, the results displayed in Figure 1 cannot tell us much about the effect of unions on
attitudes.
The standard approaches for dealing with this challenge are to use demographic and attitudinal con-
trols to account for the possibility of self-selection. Any set of controls requires, of course, that those
12Results available on request.
13Stegmueller and Becher (2104) deal with a similar challenge in the literature on unions and voter turnout, using US panel
data to show that the effect of self-selection is real, but modest.
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variables be observed. Since public opinion surveys are limited in the amount of information they can
collect, simply controlling for all possible demographics in a ‘kitchen sink’ regression would still leave
open the possibility of substantial omitted variable bias.
Using attitudes as controls to account for differences between members and non-members is likely
to reduce this problem, but introduces another challenge. Since unions may affect attitudes other than
those concerning immigration, controlling for a measure of ideology raises the issue of post-treatment
bias (King and Zeng, 2006). If joining a union changes one’s ideas about politics, surely one of the things
changed is left-right self-placement. The structure of causation among ideas that are all measured on the
same survey at the same time simply cannot be determined with any certainty, and there are plausible
theories suggesting the causal arrows could flow in a number of patterns.
In this section, I introduce an alternative method of detecting selection bias. I consider the effects
of unions separately in countries where the economic, legal, and social incentives are strong enough
to induce most eligible workers to join a union and those countries where such incentives are weaker.
Using measures of collective bargaining coverage and union density from Visser (2011), I calculate the
percentage of individuals covered by collective bargaining who are union members.14 Within the Western
and Southern European immigration-receiving countries, this number, which I will call the density ratio
(DR), ranges from 0.18 in France to slightly more than 1 in Cyprus.15
In many cases, the coverage of collectively bargained contracts in France and other low-density
countries is extended to non-unionized firms and to non-members who work alongside union members.
Unions in these countries solve the basic public goods problem16 by recruiting ideologically committed
workers to join and run the union. Haus (2002) argues that
French unions operate more in the realm of ideas and are more radical in their vision. Their
behavior is more ideational than that of their counterparts in the United States.
Thus, self-selection should be strongest in countries like France. On the other hand, where unions admin-
ister health insurance and pensions only to their members, and where reaping the benefits of collective
bargaining requires joining the union, they take on the character of so-called ‘club goods,’ and most in-
dividuals will join the union for reasons that have little to do with politics. Here, union activists and the
rank and file may well have substantially different opinions across a range of issues, including immigra-
tion.
To the extent that the effects identified in Figure 1 are stronger in the countries that rely on ideological
commitment to recruit members, we have good reason to suspect that the relationship is driven by self-
selection, rather than a true effect of union membership on attitudes. Figure 4 shows that the selection
effect is strongest on economic questions. In countries where the selection effect is strongest (those with
a low density ratio), the relationship between union membership and beliefs about the economic impact
of immigration is much stronger than in countries where self-selection is likely to be weaker. The same
is not true, however, for cultural attitudes, and is only weakly true for those indices that mix economic
and cultural questions.
The fact that self-selection is a problem in estimating the impact of unions on economic attitudes but
not for other aspects of immigration attitudes suggests that union activists (members in low DR countries,
leaders in high DR countries) reject the simple supply and demand story of immigration and wages,
preferring to emphasize the economic benefits. Since high DR effect in Figure 4 depicts the difference
between non-members and a mix of member types, activists do not appear to be particularly successful
in convincing the rank and file of the economic benefits of immigration. They do, however, appear to
14For reasons related to completeness, I use Visser’s “Adjusted Coverage” rather than “Coverage.” This decision does not
affect the results displayed below.
15Within Western and Southern Europe, there is no country whose DR falls between Switzerland (0.54) and the United
Kingdom (0.72). This is the break I use to delineate high and low DRs.
16For a discussion of the various ways unions solve the challenge of convincing workers to contribute membership dues and
work for the management of the union and the collective bargaining process, see Olson (1971).
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Figure 4: This shows the difference between the responses of union members and non-members on five immigration indices
after controlling for education, income (logged), age, age2, gender, living in a rural setting, being a native, survey round, and
country fixed effects. Note that all dependent variables are scaled to run from 0 (least immigrant friendly) to 1 (most immigrant
friendly).
convince members to ignore cultural arguments against immigration. A long literature on the role of
unions in building a working class identity (e.g. Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Frymer, 2008) suggests
that one of the key roles of unions is to emphasize class solidarity over racial or cultural cleavages. These
results suggest that contemporary European unions are succeeding at this task.
Conclusion
The evidence presented above confirms the now conventional wisdom that trade unions in most of
Europe have joined the pro-immigrant coalition, suggests that the content of the message (unambiguously
in favor of migrants on non-discrimination grounds, ambiguous on economic grounds) has reached their
members, and shows that this effect has become stronger over time. The magnitude of this effect is
approximately equal to that of a year of education, an individual characteristic whose importance for
immigration attitudes is unquestioned. Leaders of unions (and other interest groups) can take heart from
these results. Despite a wealth of evidence on the transitory nature of political messaging and skepticism
about the importance of opinion leaders in an age of mass internet access,17 their message does seem to
get across to their members. Their preferences affect those of their members, giving them a way to shape
the political process beyond the direct lobbying that is often seen as the key mechanism of influence.
What does this mean for research on public attitudes toward immigration? There are two important
lessons to draw from these results. First, they suggest that scholars of public opinion in general, and pub-
lic opinion toward immigration in particular, should pay more attention to groups that fall between the
individual and the nation or state.18 The focus in past work has generally been on individual characteris-
tics (age, education, income) contextual effects (local labor markets, regional concentration of migrants)
or national effects (migrant population, unemployment rate). Union membership, when addressed, has
17Prior (2005) has provided good reason to be skeptical that increasing access to internet news and policy analysis will
decrease the knowledge gap between the mass public and political elites, and his arguments apply just as well to opinion
leaders and their followers.
18For examples of recent work emphasizing this need, see Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg (2014) and Donnelly
(2013).
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typically been treated as an individual characteristic. Explicitly tying this characteristic to the attitudes
of union leaders allows us to theorize and examine a more complete causal chain.
In this respect, examining the change over time in the effects of union membership on attitudes —
which is consistent with, if lagging, the change in union elite attitudes — allows us to better understand
how attitudes are formed in context. A central debate in the political behavior literature turns on the
reliability of survey responses as a measure of public opinion. The results here contribute to that line of
thinking by embedding a survey response that falls between those often thought to be quite ephemeral or
context-dependent (such as attitudes toward particular regulations) and those often thought to be much
more stable (ideological self-placement). Though survey respondents socially embedded in a union are
slow to respond to changes at the elite level, they do, in fact, tend to follow the leader.
The second important lesson for scholars of immigration politics is that the nuanced arguments
unions seem to be putting forward on the economic effects of immigration produce weaker effects than
the clear non-discrimination arguments that produce strong effects on cultural attitudes. This could be
because economic messages are inherently harder to communicate, because unions are genuinely am-
bivalent about the economic impact of immigration, or because the nuanced message is simply harder to
interpret. Future research should examine whether, and to what extent, strong, unambiguous economic
arguments in favor of migration from credible sources19 produces clearer positive effects. The question
of whether perceptions of economic interest are as susceptible to political messaging is an open, and
important, one.
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